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Lost In a Maze of Character
Evidence: How the Federal Courts
Lack a Cohesive Approach to
Applying Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) in Drug
Distribution Cases
Brian Byrne1
I.

Introduction

The admission of a criminal defendant’s prior bad acts can
be a powerful tool for attaining a conviction. The federal courts
are currently divided as to whether the defendant’s prior drug
use is admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence when the defendant is charged with distributing a
controlled dangerous substance.
Part I of this Comment will briefly explore the historical
roots of Rule 404(b). Part II will examine the permissible
purposes for admitting prior bad acts under Rule 404(b). Part III
will discuss the circuit split that has developed as to whether the
defendant’s prior drug use can be admissible under one of the
exceptions to Rule 404(b) in a prosecution for possession with
intent to distribute. Part IV examines a new standard for
analyzing prior drug offenses under Rule 404(b) and argues that
courts should move away from a mechanical framework of
applying Rule 404(b). Part V will briefly summarize this
Comment.
A.

History of Excluding Prior Bad Acts
The general rule in American law is that propensity proof

1. B.A., 2012, Seton Hall University; J.D. Candidate, 2016, Pace
University School of Law.
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should be excluded.2 Rule 404(b) codified this principle in the
Federal Rule of Evidence.3 Rule 404(b)(1) states in relevant part
that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible
to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.”4 However, evidence of character may be admissible
to prove the defendant’s “motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or
lack of accident.”5 Rule 404(b) establishes a general rule that an
individual’s character cannot be established through evidence of
his prior acts, unless those prior acts relate to a permissible
purpose.
The United States Supreme Court has delineated a fourstep framework for the admission of 404(b) evidence.6 First, the
evidence must be offered for a non-propensity purpose.7 Second,
the evidence must be relevant pursuant to Rule 402.8 Third, the
trial court must weigh the probative value of the evidence
against the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403.9
Fourth, the trial court must instruct the jury that the evidence
can only be considered for the specific purpose for which it was
admitted.10 This framework merely ensures that evidence is
probative to something other than propensity, and that the
evidence is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.11
While Rule 404(b) was uncontroversial when Congress
passed the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, its proper
application has engendered a significant amount of
controversy.12 Identifying whether the prior conviction is
2. See generally People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
3. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
4. Id.
5. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
6. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (finding that
evidence of the prior act should be admitted if there is “sufficient evidence to
support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act.”).
7. Id. at 691.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 691-92.
11. See United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2013). See also
FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing the exclusion of evidence if the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger for unfair prejudice).
12. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note (finding that “Rule
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relevant to some issue other than the defendant’s propensity has
proven difficult at the trial and appellate levels.13
B.

Propensity Proof is Relevant

Rule 404(b)(2) establishes that a defendant’s prior bad acts
must be relevant to something other than proving character.
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as having “any tendency to
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence; and the fact is of consequence to the determination of
the action.”14 In essence, Rule 401 requires the evidence to be
material and probative. First, the evidence is material if it goes
to the “determination of the action.” Second, the evidence is
probative if it makes a “fact more or less probable without the
evidence.” However, relevance is a necessary, not a sufficient
condition of admissibility.15
Rule 404(b) is designed to protect the defendant from being
found guilty based on the inference of bad character. There is a
fear that the defendant’s prior bad acts will weigh too heavily
“with the jury . . . and deny him [the defendant] a fair
opportunity to defend against a particular charge.”16 While
evidence of an individual’s character may be relevant, there is
also the risk that the evidence will be unfairly prejudicial.17
The party seeking admission of a prior bad must show that

404(b) has emerged as one of the most cited Rules in the Rules of Evidence.”).
See also Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The
Trouble with Rule 404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 209 (2001) (noting that Rule
404(b) was one of the least controversial rules during the passage of the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
13. See Reed, supra note 11.
14. FED. R. EVID. 401.
15. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
16. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948) (alterations
added).
17. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (finding that
while propensity proof is relevant “‘the risk that a jury will convict for crimes
other than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway
because a bad person deserves punishment—creates a prejudicial effect that
outweighs ordinary relevance.’” (quoting United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61,
63 (1st Cir. 1982) (Breyer, J.) (alterations in original)). See also David Culberg,
The Accused's Bad Character: Theory and Practice, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1343, 1351 (2009) (noting that it is obvious that propensity proof is relevant).
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it is admissible for a non-propensity purpose.18 Rule 404(b) is
designed to prevent the prosecution from being able to infer to
the jury that the defendant is a person of bad character.
However, even when admitted for a non-propensity purpose
under Rule 404(b), it is highly debatable whether the current
rule eliminates the risk that the jury will take the evidence as
propensity proof. For instance, Rule 404(b) could allow a prior
act to be admitted to show the defendant’s motive to commit the
crime if it was not propensity proof. However, in reality, the jury
is still being informed of the defendant’s prior act and could use
the evidence as propensity proof.19
C.

People v. Molineux20

Decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1901, People
v. Molineux is considered one of the premier cases that dealt
with the exclusion of bad acts prior to the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.21 In Molineux, the defendant was charged
with the murder of Katherine Adams.22 The undisputed facts of
the case were that Harry Cornish received a package in the mail
containing a substance that he believed was “bromo seltzer.”23
When his landlady, Katherine Adams, became ill, Cornish
administered the substance to her, believing it was medicine.24
Adams died after being administered the substance.25 Shortly
after, it was revealed that the contents of the bottle contained a
deadly poison.26 The prosecution theorized that the defendant,
Molineux, had mailed the poison to Cornish with the intention
of killing him.27 The alleged motive was that Molineux and
18. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
19. See generally Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule
Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1547, 1555 (1998) (arguing that the distinction
between non-character use of 404(b) and a propensity inference exists in
“principal only”).
20. People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
21. See Reed, supra note 11, at 201.
22. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 286-87.
23. Id. at 287.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 288.
27. Id. at 289.
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Cornish had developed a bitter rivalry over a woman that they
were both interested in.28
At Molineux’s trial for the death of Adams, the prosecution
was allowed to introduce evidence concerning the death of Henry
A. Barnet.29 Barnett had died a few months before Adams after
consuming a substance that he received through the mail.30 It
was later established that Barnett and Adams had both died as
a result of being poisoned by cyanide of mercury.31 In essence,
the government was contending that Molineux had killed
Barnett as well. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals
analyzed the admissibility of the other acts evidence that was
presented against Molineux. The Court found that evidence of a
prior bad act can be admissible when it tends to show motive,
intent, absence of mistake, common scheme or plan, or the
identity of the perpetrator.32
After examining these different exceptions, the court found
that the evidence of Barnett’s death should have been
excluded.33 The court rejected the prosecution’s theory that the
similarity of the two killings established that Molineux killed
Adams.34 Despite evidence of Molineux’s training as a chemist,
the court found that he was not the only person who possessed
the “knowledge, skill, and material to produce the poison which
was sent to Cornish.”35 Molineux now stands for the principle
that a prior bad act cannot be admitted without meeting specific
non-character purposes. The purposes mentioned by the
Molineux Court have become the framework of Rule 404(b).

II. Proper Purposes for Admission of Prior Bad Acts
Rule 404(b)(1) makes it clear that propensity proof is
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 290.
Id. at 289, 293.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 315-16.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 303.
Id.
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inadmissible.36 However, 404(b)(2) lists a number of proper uses
for the prior bad act.37 The purposes in 404(b)(2) do not establish
exceptions to Rule 404(b)’s prohibition on propensity proof.
Rather they demonstrate non-propensity uses of the prior act
evidence.38
A.

Motive

A prior bad act can be admitted to prove the defendant’s
motive for committing the crime.39 United States v.
Cunningham40 is illustrative of how a prior bad act can be
properly admitted to show the defendant’s motive. Cunningham,
a nurse, was convicted of tampering with a consumer product by
allegedly removing Demerol from syringes and replacing it with
a saline solution.41 After it was discovered that Cunningham had
a previous addiction to Demerol, she agreed to a blood and urine
test to detect for Demerol.42 After testing revealed that
Cunningham had recently used Demerol, she was arrested for
the theft.43
The district court admitted evidence that Cunningham had
previously had her license suspended due to her theft of Demerol
at another hospital.44 Following her conviction, Cunningham
challenged the admission of this evidence on appeal. The
Seventh Circuit found that evidence of Cunningham’s
suspension did not show a propensity to steal, but showed her
motive to continue feeding her Demerol addiction.45 In other
words, the admission of Cunningham’s suspension was not
propensity proof, but established her motive to commit the
36. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). However, this rule is not without
exceptions. See FED. R. EVID. 412-415 (allowing propensity proof when the
defendant is accused of certain sex offenses).
37. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
38. See United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 855 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014) (en
banc).
39. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
40. United States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
41. Id. at 555.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 556.
45. Id.
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crime.
B.

Knowledge

A prior act can also be admissible to show the defendant’s
knowledge in the current crime. In United States v. Vargas,46 the
defendant was arrested after DEA agents found 282 kilograms
of cocaine in a secret compartment of a produce trailer he was
driving.47 Vargas claimed that he did not know the cocaine was
there and he was only aware of the lawful items in the trailer.
At trial, the government sought to introduce evidence of previous
instances in which Vargas had transported drugs in refrigerated
trailers similar to the vehicle he was driving in the present
case.48 The district court admitted the evidence of the other acts,
finding that they were relevant to the defendant “knowingly”
transporting cocaine.49
Upon his conviction, Vargas challenged the admission of the
other acts evidence as a violation of Rule 404(b). However, the
Seventh Circuit found that Vargas’ prior acts of transporting
drugs in similar refrigerated vehicles were relevant to his
knowledge that he was transporting drugs in the present case.50
Since Vargas was claiming that he had no knowledge of the
cocaine’s presence, his prior acts of transporting cocaine in
similar circumstances were probative of his knowledge in the
present case. As such, the prosecution could argue that the prior
acts made it more likely that Vargas was aware of the cocaine’s
presence. However, the prosecution could not argue that the
evidence showed a propensity to transport drugs. 51
C.

Identity

A prior bad act can also be admitted when it is probative of
the defendant’s identity. Identity is an exception to 404(b) when
46. United States v. Vargas, 552 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2008).
47. Id. at 552.
48. Id. at 553.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. It is certainly debatable whether an ordinary juror would be able to
make such a fine distinction.
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the prior act and the present charge share a similarity that
“earmarks the behavior as that of the same person.”52 In other
words, the acts are so distinctive that it can be fairly inferred
that the same person committed them.
In United States v. Shumway,53 the defendant, an
archeologist, was convicted of charges stemming from
unauthorized excavations at a site in Canyonlands National
Park.54 Shumway claimed that he was not responsible for the
excavations that occurred.55 To establish Shumway’s identity,
the government moved to admit evidence of Shumway’s prior
activities at the same site a number of years earlier.56
The district court admitted the evidence of Shumway’s prior
activities as relevant to proving his identity under Rule 404(b).57
On appeal, Shumway argued that his prior archeological
activities at the site lacked the distinctiveness to be admissible
under the identity exception to Rule 404(b).58 The Tenth Circuit
found that the prior acts were relevant to Shumway’s identity in
two respects.59 First, both acts occurred at the same site, and
the unique geographical location made the acts “distinctive.”60
Second, the court found that the acts required specialized
knowledge, also making them distinctive.61 As a result, the
evidence was relevant under Rule 404(b) as proof of Shumway’s
identity.62 The evidence was admissible since Shumway’s
identity was in dispute, and the evidence was relevant towards
proving that he committed the excavations.
III. The Circuit Split

52. See also Allen v. State, 720 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind. 1999) (finding that
the rationale of the exception is that “the crimes, or means used to commit
them, were so similar and unique that it is highly probable that the same
person committed all of them.”).
53. United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413 (10th Cir. 1997).
54. Id. at 1417.
55. Id. at 1418.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1418.
58. Id. at 1419.
59. Id. at 1420.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1421.
62. Id.
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A. Circuits That Have Excluded Prior Drug Use When the
Defendant Is Charged With Distribution of a Controlled
Dangerous Substance
The federal courts of appeals are currently divided as to
whether a prior conviction for possession of a controlled
substance can be admissible in a later prosecution for possession
with the intent to distribute.
In United States v. Davis,63 the Third Circuit addressed the
issue of whether a prior possession conviction was admissible
under Rule 404(b) in a prosecution for possession with the intent
to distribute.64 In Davis, Philadelphia police observed the
defendant, Davis, and a companion seated in a car and engaged
in what appeared to be a drug deal.65 As the police approached
the car, the two men quickly exited and began to walk away. The
police conducted a Terry66 stop of the two individuals and
discovered that Davis and his companion were carrying large
amounts of cash.67 Inside the car, the police found 740 grams of
cocaine. Davis was charged with possessing a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a) (1).68
Prior to trial, the government sought to introduce Davis’
2007 conviction for possession of cocaine.69 The government
contended that the prior conviction was not being offered to
prove Davis’ character, but was relevant to his “plan to,
knowledge of, and intent to distribute and/or possess cocaine,
and absence of mistake or accident.”70 Davis argued that the
evidence of his prior conviction was only being offered to show
his propensity to commit drug offenses.71

63. United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434 (3d Cir. 2013).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 437-38.
66. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
67. Davis, 726 F.3d at 437-38.
68. Id.
69. See United States v. Davis, No. 11-227, 2011 WL 5339280, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 7, 2011).
70. Id. at *3.
71. Id.
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The district court admitted the evidence, finding that Davis’
prior cocaine conviction was relevant to his knowledge of what
cocaine looked like.72 Additionally, the court found that Davis’
prior possession of cocaine made it less plausible that he was
only a passenger inside the car.73 The district court also
concluded that Davis’ prior conviction was not unduly
prejudicial under Rule 403.74
Following his conviction, Davis contended on appeal that
the the admission of his prior possession conviction violated Rule
404(b).75 The government argued that the prior conviction was
admissible to show Davis’ knowledge of the cocaine and his
intent to distribute it.76
The Third Circuit found that the prior possession conviction
was not admissible to prove Davis’ knowledge of the cocaine in
the car.77 First, the court surmised that cocaine could look
differently when packaged for distribution. Moreover, the court
pointed out that there are different forms of cocaine, and it was
not established which form of cocaine Davis had previously
possessed and whether the drugs found in the car were the
same.78 Due to these differences, the court concluded that the
prior cocaine possession was not relevant to prove Davis’
knowledge in this case.79 Moreover, the court found that the
prior conviction’s weak probative value was outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.80
Secondly, the court found the prior conviction inadmissible
to prove Davis’ intent to distribute the cocaine.81 The court
focused on the difference between possessing a drug for personal
use and distributing it commercially.82 Examining this
distinction, the Third Circuit refused to accept the logic that
prior drug use implied an intent to distribute drugs at a later
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Davis, 726 F.3d at 440.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 444.
Id.
Id.
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date.83 While acknowledging a circuit split on this issue, the
court found that Davis’ prior conviction lacked probative value
and should have been excluded.84
A few days before the Third Circuit issued its ruling in
Davis, the Seventh Circuit decided the same issue in United
States v. Lee.85 Defendant Eddie Lee was charged with
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and conspiracy to
commit the same offense.86 Included in the indictment were
Lee’s alleged co-conspirators, Darin Hurt, Anthony Clardy, and
Christopher Holcolmb.87 It was the government’s theory that
Lee was Hurt’s cocaine supplier.88
In December 2009, Lee was pulled over on the interstate due
to an expired registration on the car he was driving.89 Lee
explained to the police that the car belonged to his
goddaughter.90 After a drug-detection dog detected the presence
of narcotics, the officers conducted a search of the car but did not
find any drugs.91 Following the search, the police impounded the
car due to an expired registration.92
Later that day, Lee was in the car with Darin Hurt when
the police stopped the car as part of a narcotics investigation.93
After an officer searched the car for drugs, Lee informed the
police that his car had been impounded earlier that day.94 Later
that day, Drug Enforcement Agents went to the tow yard and
led a narcotics dog around Lee’s car.95 After the canine signaled
83. Id. The court found that possession of a drug for personal use is far
different than distributing it commercially. See United States v. Ono, 918 F.2d
1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that “[a]cts related to the personal use of a
controlled substance are of a wholly different order than acts involving the
distribution of a controlled substance.”).
84. Davis, 726 F.3d at 445.
85. United States v. Lee, 724 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2013).
86. Id. at 970.
87. Id. Of these defendants only Lee would end up going to trial.
88. Id. at 970-71.
89. Id. at 972. The stop of Lee’s car was not related to the investigation
of Lee’s drug distribution activity.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 972.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 973.
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positively at the car, the agents received a warrant to search the
vehicle.96 The agents subsequently discovered 210 grams of
cocaine in a bag behind the spare tire in Lee’s trunk.97 At trial,
Lee did not call any witnesses. Lee’s defense was that the car
was not his and he was unaware of the cocaine’s presence in the
trunk.98 Lee’s first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury was
unable to reach a verdict on the possession or conspiracy
charge.99
Prior to Lee’s second trial, the government sought to
introduce Lee’s 2004 conviction for possession of cocaine.100 The
government argued that Lee’s prior conviction “helped prove
that Lee was not an innocent bystander who was framed by
malevolent police officers. He was an experienced cocaine dealer
who was stopped while making a fifth delivery of drugs to his
‘co-conspirator.’”101 Without explanation, the district court
admitted Lee’s 2004 conviction.102 Having been presented with
Lee’s prior conviction and other relevant evidence, the jury
convicted Lee on both the possession and conspiracy charge.103
On appeal, Lee argued that the district court had abused its
discretion in admitting his 2004 possession conviction.104
Agreeing with Lee, the Seventh Circuit reversed his
conviction.105 The court found that in order for a prior act to be
admissible under 404(b), the district court must closely analyze
96. Id.
97. Id. There was an eight-hour gap between the original search of Lee’s
car and the second search at the tow yard.
98. Id. Lee also pointed out that the eight-hour gap between the two
searches, although Lee’s attorney denied that the defense was asserting that
the drugs had been planted. Id. at 974.
99. Id. at 973.
100. Id. Lee’s 2004 conviction was for possession of more than 15 but less
than 100 grams of cocaine. Id.
101. Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 20, United States v. Lee, 724 F.3d
968 (2013)(No. 12-1718), 2013 WL 1208774 at *20. In essence, the government
was arguing that Lee’s prior conviction was relevant because of his claim to be
an innocent bystander. There appeared to be precedent within the Seventh
Circuit to support this argument. See United States v. Chavis, 429 F.3d 662,
668 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that defendant’s prior drug conviction was relevant
to prove his intent when he claimed to be a “clueless bystander.”).
102. Lee, 724 F.3d at 974.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 975.
105. Id.
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the “specific matter that the evidence is being offered to
establish.”106 In other words, where the government claims that
the prior bad act is being offered to show intent, the district court
must analyze the extent to which the defendant’s intent is at
issue.107
The court was especially critical of the government’s theory
that Lee’s five-year-old possession conviction was relevant to his
intent to distribute cocaine in 2009.108 While acknowledging that
the government had the obligation of proving Lee’s intent, this
did not automatically equate to the admission of Lee’s prior acts
to show his intent.109 Finding that Lee’s intent or knowledge was
not in genuine dispute, the court held that the prior conviction
was propensity evidence that must be excluded under Rule
404(b).110
Moreover, Lee’s innocent bystander defense did not bring
his intent or knowledge into dispute.111 Lee did not claim that
the quantity of drugs found in the vehicle was not intended for
distribution, nor did he claim that he had no knowledge of
cocaine.112 The court also rejected the government’s contention
that the conviction was admissible to prove absence of mistake.
Lee was not claiming that he had unknowingly placed the drugs
in the car; he was asserting that the drugs did not belong to
him.113 As a result, the prior conviction was not probative
towards proving the absence of any mistake on Lee’s part.
Similar to the Seventh, the Sixth Circuit has also excluded
a prior possession conviction in a prosecution for possession with
intent to distribute.114 In United States v. Haywood,115 the
defendant was prosecuted for possession with intent to
distribute arising out of a sale to a government informant.116 At
trial, the government sought to introduce evidence that
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 976.
Id.
Id. at 979.
Id.
Id. at 980-81.
Id. at 980.
Id. at 978.
Id. at 979.
United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 717.
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Haywood had also been arrested for possession of cocaine within
a few months of his sale to the informant.117 The district court
admitted the arrest for straight possession, finding that it was
probative of Haywood’s intent to distribute the cocaine in the
current case.118
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that the district court
had abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Haywood’s
arrest for straight possession of cocaine.119 While acknowledging
that Haywood’s intent to distribute the cocaine was at issue in
the case, the court determined that the possession conviction
was not sufficiently probative of Haywood’s intent.120 The court
found that there was a lack of similarity between possessing a
small amount of cocaine for personal use and distributing it
commercially.121 Due to the different quantities between the two
acts, the court found that the possession conviction was
irrelevant to proving Haywood’s intent to distribute.122
Moreover, the court found that even if Haywood’s possession was
probative of his intent to distribute, its admission was
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.123
Haywood’s dissenting opinion criticized the majority for
failing to see the relevance of Haywood’s prior possession of
cocaine and its probative value on his intent to distribute.124 The
dissent found it especially relevant that both acts involved the
use of cocaine.125 Carrying a certain drug on a number of
occasions supports the inference that the defendant intents to
distribute that drug at a later time.126 Moreover, the dissent
argued the defendant’s prior possession of cocaine was probative
of his knowledge that he was distributing cocaine in the present
matter.127
While Lee, Davis, and Haywood should not be interpreted as
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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Id. at 720.
Id.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 722-23.
Id. at 721-22.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 723.
Id. at 726 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 727 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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adopting per se rules of exclusion, these decisions created a high
standard of admissibility for a prior drug possession conviction
when the defendant is charged with possession with intent to
distribute. These decisions recognize that the relevance of a
prior conviction for straight possession only has marginal
relevance towards proving the defendant’s intent to distribute,
or knowledge of a controlled dangerous substance. Recognizing
the highly prejudicial nature of the prior conviction and its
marginal relevance, these courts have placed a heavy burden on
the government to show that the prior possession conviction is
probative of the defendant’s intent or knowledge to distribute in
the present case.
B.

The Opposing View

However, other circuits have taken a far more inclusive
approach to the admission of prior drug use to prove the
defendant’s intent or knowledge to distribute a controlled
dangerous substance.
In United States v. Gadison,128 the defendant was charged
with conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.129
The district court admitted the defendant’s prior state court
conviction for possession of cocaine, finding that it was probative
of his intent to distribute in the present case.130 Upon conviction,
the defendant argued that the admission of his prior cocaine
convictions violated Rule 404(b). Rejecting this argument, the
Fifth Circuit found that the prior conviction was admissible to
prove the defendant’s intent to distribute the drugs.131 The
framework used by the Fifth Circuit centered on whether the
prior conviction was relevant to any issue other than the
defendant’s character.132 After a very brief analysis, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the prior cocaine conviction was
admissible, since it was relevant toward proving the defendant’s
intent.133
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 191.
Id.
Id. at 192.
Id.
Id.
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The Eight Circuit has also held that prior drug use is
admissible to show the defendant’s intent to distribute.134 While
the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the defendant’s prior
conviction only related to personal drug use, the court concluded
that it was relevant toward proving the defendant’s intent to
distribute in the present case.135 Similar to the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has also repeatedly admitted prior
drug convictions related to personal use in order to prove the
defendant’s intent to distribute.136
IV. What is the Proper Standard?
At the heart of Rule 404(b) is the belief that a defendant’s
propensity to commit a crime is not a valid basis for the
admission of character evidence.137 While there is broad
agreement on this principle, it has proven difficult to administer
where a defendant is charged with possession with intent to
distribute.138
The current circuit split on whether a defendant’s prior drug
possession can be properly admitted to prove the defendant’s
intent to distribute narcotics reflects a fundamental
misconception of how Rule 404(b) should be applied. Courts that
have adopted a broad standard of admissibility have focused on
the fact that the defendant’s intent is at issue in a drug
distribution case.139 However, just because the the defendant’s
intent is formally at issue does not mean that the prior
conviction is admissible in a non-propensity way. Judge
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has noted, that the “list of
exceptions in Rule 404(b), if mechanically applied, would
overwhelm the central principle. Almost any bad evidence
simultaneously condemns by besmirching character and by

134. See United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172 (8th Cir. 1997).
135. Id. at 1177-78.
136. See United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1195 (11th Cir. 1997);
See also United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211, 1226 (11th Cir. 2013).
137. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
138. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012); see also United States v. Monzon, 869
F.2d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that the defendant’s intent is at issue
when charged with a specific intent crime).
139. See generally United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1993).
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showing one or more of ‘motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake . . . .’”140
One of the main points of confusion regarding the
application of Rule 404(b) is how to identify whether a prior
offense is only probative of the defendant’s propensity to commit
the charged offense. Part of this confusion can be traced to a lack
of guidance on this issue.141 While courts have frequently
applied modifications of the four-step framework in
Huddleston,142 these approaches have failed to closely scrutinize
whether the prior act is being offered for a non-propensity
purpose. In order to faithfully apply Rule 404(b), courts must
adopt a framework that places a greater emphasis on analyzing
how the prior act relates to the current offense without
amounting to propensity proof. This can be accomplished by
focusing on the core principles of Rule 404(b).
A.

The Seventh Circuit’s Approach

A recent en banc ruling from the Seventh Circuit built upon
other decisions in that Circuit to provide a solid foundation for
evaluating whether a prior act is admissible under Rule 404(b).
In United States v. Gomez,143 the Seventh Circuit noted the
recurring problems with applying Rule 404(b) in the drug
context, and adopted a “rules-based approach” to determine if
the prior act relates to anything other than the defendant’s
propensity to commit the charged offense.144
The Seventh Circuit first noted that it had previously
applied a four-part test to determine the admissibility of prior
acts evidence under Rule 404(b).145 Finding that this test had
140. United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 1987)
(alterations and emphasis in original).
141. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note (stating that “no
mechanical solution is offered”).
142. See United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
143. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 852. The four-part test called for the court to evaluate whether:
1) the prior act is relevant to something other than the defendant’s propensity;
2) the act must be similar to the current charge and close in time; 3) the
evidence must be sufficient to establish that the prior act occurred; and 4) the
probative value of the prior act cannot be substantially outweighed by the
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“ceased to be useful,” the court determined that a “rules-based
framework” would more effectively serve the purpose of Rule
404(b) in preventing the admission of propensity proof.146
Briefly stated, Nicolas Gomez was charged with conspiracy
to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.147 Gomez’s alleged
involvement in the conspiracy stemmed from a federal
investigation of Robert Romero, a known Chicago cocaine
dealer.148 After federal agents wiretapped Romero’s phone, they
intercepted a number of conversations between Romero, and a
reseller in Milwaukee, known as “Guerro.”149 The agents were
able to trace these phone calls to Gomez’s residence in
Milwaukee.150
Four weeks after Gomez met with Romero in Milwaukee,
Gomez was arrested under the theory that he was “Guerro.”151
After Gomez’s home was searched, federal agents found a small
quantity of cocaine in the bedroom.152 At trial, the district court
admitted the cocaine found in Gomez’s bedroom, finding that it
was relevant to prove that Gomez was “Guerro.”153 After being
convicted, Gomez appealed on the grounds that the admission of
the cocaine found in his bedroom was a violation of Rule
404(b).154
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the multi-prong test
it had previously used.155 Rather, the focus must be on the
“chain of reasoning” of why the evidence is being offered for a
non-propensity purpose.156 In essence, the court must examine
“how exactly the evidence is relevant to that purpose . . . .”157
The second step in the Seventh Circuit’s approach is to
examine whether, even if the other act evidence is relevant
danger of unfair prejudice.
146. Id. at 853.
147. Id. at 851.
148. Id. at 850.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 851.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 852.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 854.
156. See id. at 856.
157. See id. (emphasis in original).
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without relying on propensity, it is unfairly prejudicial under
Rule 403’s balancing test.158 As such, even if the prior act
evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), the court must still
weigh the probative value of the evidence against the danger of
unfair prejudice.159
Applying this rule to the facts of Gomez, the court found that
the cocaine in Gomez’s bedroom was propensity proof.160 The
court concluded that the prosecution’s argument relied upon the
premise that because Gomez possessed a small amount of
cocaine in his home, it was more likely that he was part of the
cocaine distribution conspiracy.161 Due to this reasoning, the
Seventh Circuit held that the cocaine in Gomez’s bedroom was
propensity proof and inadmissible under Rule 404(b).162
B.

Advantages of the Seventh Circuit’s Approach

The Seventh Circuit’s approach in Gomez provides a solid
foundation for assessing the admissibility of prior acts evidence
under Rule 404(b). The Gomez court correctly recognized that
analyzing a prior act under a multi-prong framework has the
danger of creating an “artificial checklist.”163 The Gomez court
appeared to be concerned that district judges were falling into
the trap of simply identifying a proper basis, such as intent or
identity under Rule 404(b), without examining whether that
basis was relevant in a non-propensity way.164
Despite Rule 404(b)’s prohibition on propensity evidence,
the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have routinely
admitted evidence of prior drug use in order to show the
defendant’s intent to distribute, or knowledge of a controlled
158. See id. See also FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing the court to exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice).
159. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 857.
160. See id. at 861. A majority of the court concluded that the admission
of the cocaine was harmless error. Id. at 864. However, four judges of the
Seventh Circuit dissented, finding that the admission of the cocaine was not
harmless. See generally id. at 865 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 864.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 853.
164. Id.
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dangerous substance.165 The crucial flaw in this analysis is that
it fails to analyze how the prior drug use is relevant without
relying on a propensity inference. Rather, their approach of
automatic inclusion is satisfied when the government shows
that the prior act is “(1) relevant to a material issue; (2) proved
by a preponderance of the evidence; (3) higher in probative value
than in prejudicial effect; and (4) similar in kind and close in
time to the crime charged.”166 While this approach may be sound
in theory, it fails to adequately guard against propensity proof.
As the Gomez court realized, employing a mechanical
interpretation of Rule 404(b) reduces the court’s analysis to
simply checking formal boxes on the way to inevitable
admissibility.167 By failing to analyze how the prior drug use is
relevant without relying on propensity, these courts are only
paying lip-service to the requirements of Rule 404(b).
Applying the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Gomez, it is
clear that when a defendant is charged with possession with
intent to distribute, a prior act of straight possession is only
relevant to show a propensity to commit the charged offense.
The Third Circuit noted in Davis that there is a substantial
difference between the two offenses.168 Moreover, the idea that
straight possession shows the defendant’s intent to distribute
drugs later relies upon a propensity inference: he is more likely
to do it again since he did it before.169 The Seventh Circuit’s
approach guards against this propensity inference by requiring
the proponent of the evidence to show how the evidence is
relevant without relying on propensity.
V.

Conclusion

165. See Deena Greenberg, Closing Pandora's Box: Limiting the Use of
404(b) to Introduce Prior Convictions in Drug Prosecutions, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L
L. REV. 519, 530 (2015) (noting that at least the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits have applied a “presumptive approach” for admitting drug convictions
under Rule 404(b)).
166. United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1178 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting
United States v. Campbell, 937 F.2d 404, 408 (8th Cir. 1998)).
167. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 854.
168. See Davis, 726 F.3d 434 at 444.
169. See Lee, 724 F.3d at 979 (noting that Lee’s prior possession did not
show his intent to distribute).

http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/7

20

644

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:2

Rule 404(b) makes it clear that a defendant’s prior acts
cannot be used to show propensity to commit the charged
offense. However, courts have had difficulty identifying
propensity proof. To solve this problem, courts must look to the
fundamental purpose behind Rule 404(b): to exclude evidence
that is only relevant to prove the defendant’s character. The
Seventh Circuit’s approach provides the most stable foundation
for excluding propensity proof by forcing the proponent to
identify how the evidence is relevant without relying on a
propensity inference.
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